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Abstract 
The past 30 years has seen an enormous growth of formalised regulation, which 
some have characterised as part of a wider phenomenon of `regulatory capitalism’. 
This has also been a period of the hegemony of neo-liberal ideologies of free 
markets. The paradox aptly described by Stephen Vogel as `freer markets, more 
rules’ has not received an adequate explanation, despite an equally enormous 
growth of studies and theories of regulation. This paper will argue that insufficient 
attention has been given to the relationship between the `naturalization’ of 
property rights, and the growth of regulation. It is generally accepted, particularly 
by liberal theory, that private property rights are essential to free markets. 
However, the acceptance as `natural’ of existing forms of private rights to property, 
in an era when economic activity has become increasingly socialized, generates 
instabilities, to which a frequent response is regulation, often of a hybrid public-
private character. This argument will be developed through two examples. Firstly, 
the analysis of financial market regulation, which over the past 30 years has been a 
paradigm of hyper-regulation, but leaving untouched the private property 
protections that have fuelled `financialization’ and speculation, and generated 
crises culminating in the crash of 2008-9. Secondly, an account of how struggles 
over the scope and definition of intellectual property rights have moulded the 
emergence and development of today’s `knowledge economy’, as the historic 
tension between private rights and the public domain has given way to the creation 
of various forms of regulated `commons’, allocating rights and remuneration. 
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1. The Public, the Private, and Property Rights 
1.1. Paradoxes of Regulatory Capitalism 
It is now some twenty years since Majone and others identified the rise of a 
`regulatory state’, which has more recently been termed `regulatory capitalism’ 
(Sunstein 1990, Majone 1993, Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005, Braithwaite 2008). 
Since then, regulation has emerged as an enormous universe of professional 
practice and of scholarship. A central feature of regulatory bureaucracies is the 
resolute emphasis on their apolitical character, despite their important role in both 
the state and the economy. Ironically, as the field of studies of regulation has 
burgeoned, it seems itself to have become an arena for professionalized academic 
practice also of a highly technical character, mainly concerned with how to manage 
and improve regulation, aiming at `smart regulation’. I suggest that we need to 
reinject some political analysis, by building on some excellent pioneering work 
which analyzed the underlying and puzzling features of the emergence of 
regulation. Indeed, only by restoring a more critical understanding of the political 
processes underlying regulation could students of regulation make a better 
contribution to its effective functioning.  
First is the paradox that the period of privatization and liberalization since the 
1980s has led to an enormous growth of regulation. Stephen Vogel in 1996 pointed 
to the apparently contradictory process of `freer markets, more rules’. Michael 
Moran has charted the rise of the `hyper-innovative’ British regulatory state 
careering `from stagnation to fiasco’ (Moran 2003). John Braithwaite has scoffed at 
the `neoliberal fairytale’ and the `myth of deregulation’, and has argued that 
regulation and mega-corporate capitalism were historically mutually constitutive 
and are now closely intertwined (Braithwaite 2008). Yet despite these insights, the 
received wisdom is not only that the dominant trend since the 1980s has been 
towards free markets, but more seriously that the role of regulation is merely to 
correct market failures and limit excesses. Thus, the design of regulatory regimes 
has aimed at `market-friendly’ regulation, as evidenced in two key arenas which 
must be considered catastrophic regulatory failures. First, financial market 
regulation has left investment banks entirely free to design exotic financial 
instruments, causing a worldwide financial crash and economic crisis; and second, 
the perceived problem of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions has been 
tackled by direct state action to create enormous new markets for `carbon trading’, 
although they have so far been at best ineffectual for their purported purpose. 
Surprisingly, studies of `smart regulation’ rarely consider how markets are actually 
constituted. The key element in enabling markets is of course the creation of 
property rights. The specific form taken by such rights, and the methods (both legal 
and other) for enforcing them, are crucial in setting the dynamics of a field of 
regulation, and should be the starting point for analysing any such field, but this is 
rarely the case. Instead, rights to property are assumed to be somehow natural, 
and little attention is paid to their design. This paper will show that it is the 
inappropriate formulation of the property rights underpinning markets that creates 
conflicts and crises and spawns hyper-regulation.  
Secondly, there has been the `privatization of regulation’. The role of the state has 
been increasingly delegated either to autonomous bodies of a public or quasi-public 
nature, or even to private entities. This includes activities previously regarded as 
the heart of government. Colin Scott has pointed to the regulatory role of private 
entities, which may even extend to controlling public as well as private activities 
(Scott 2002). The financial crisis has finally drawn public attention to one of the 
most egregious examples, the role of bond rating agencies which assess public as 
well as private entities. Having done their best with credit default swaps, they went 
on to tackle Greece and other Euro-zone governments. There has also been 
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considerable delegation of public functions, especially in developing countries, to 
civil society or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
At the same time, we have seen what some commentators have described as a 
public-ization of the private sphere (Freeman 2003). Indeed, a central feature of 
regulatory capitalism in the recent period has been the varied and complex forms of 
public-private interactions. Regulatory regimes cannot easily be distinguished 
between the public and the private, inevitably they interact, and very often they are 
hybrid. Public forms of regulation are often implemented through corporate 
networks, while private regimes are often authorized by formal law, or rely on law 
for enforcement. 
What has been evident also is not only a blurring of lines between public and 
private, but a confusion of roles. This was most starkly evident in the financial 
crisis, when it became clear, to the surprise of some, that the effect of the financial 
regulatory system built over the past 35 years has been to enable banks to 
privatize profits and pass their losses to the public purse.  
Thus, the central paradoxes of current regulatory capitalism have been 
liberalization leading to hyper-regulation, and the blurring of lines and confusion of 
roles between the public and the private. I suggest that at the heart of these 
paradoxes, and the cause of many regulatory failures, has been a mistaken 
understanding of how to construct `market-friendly regulation’. The central reason 
for this is the naturalization of the property rights and institutions devised since the 
1880s which created corporatist capitalism. It is inappropriate and inaccurate to 
treat this as a `market’ system, since the apparently private sphere of economic 
relations is dominated by large oligopolistic corporations, operating in symbiosis 
with state or public institutions. The high degree of socialization of economic 
activity means that its regulation must be underpinned by new political and 
democratic forms, rather than the managerial autocracies and technocratic 
bureaucracies now dominating corporatist capitalism.1  
1.2. Property Rights 
Basic theory tells us of course that markets require property rights. Beyond that, 
academic theory has told us surprisingly little useful about property rights. This 
seems to be largely due to a fixation on the concept of private property, amounting 
to an identification of property with private property. Philosophical and political 
theories, going back at least to C. B. Macpherson have focused on the justifications 
for private property, and have therefore been largely irrelevant to the complexity 
and malleability of property institutions, as Andrew Reeve pointed out (Macpherson 
1962, Reeve 1991, pp. 108-111). Economic theory, not surprisingly, has been 
focused on a particularly simplistic notion of private property. Thus, Barzel defines 
property in economic terms as an individual’s ability to consume a good, directly or 
indirectly through exchange (Barzel 1997, p. 3). Sociology has largely neglected 
the analysis of property (Carruthers and Ariovitch 2004), and when it does consider 
the matter is concerned mainly with the implications of property rights rather than 
analysis of the forms they take. Legal scholarship attained a high degree of 
sophistication based on the positivist-analytical approach of Hohfeld, but on the 
rare occasions when it ventures beyond this has tended to adopt either a political 
philosophy perspective (notably Waldron 1988), or that of law and economics.2 
Economic perspectives, which have been dominant in policy-making during the 
period of ascendancy of neo-liberal ideologies, have generally emphasised the 
importance of `strong’ property rights in providing the foundations for capitalism 
                                                 
1 This is one of the central themes of my book (2011), in which the examples discussed in this paper are 
treated in greater detail. 
2 The work of Margaret Radin is interesting in applying political theory to develop a very effective critique 
of the law and economics perspective in her `liberal personality theory of property’, arguing for the 
priority of rights in personal over what she describes as `fungible’ property (Radin 1993). 
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and `free markets’, but rarely consider how the way in which property rights are 
defined actually constitutes markets. 
Regulation theory, lacking an underpinning of any sophisticated theory or analysis 
of property rights, has tended to adopt an institutional approach. In particular, 
since much of the field is concerned with economic regulation, the focus has been 
on the corporation as an institution. Thus, Michael Moran’s discussion of the British 
experience of privatization rightly sees its roots in the exhaustion of the traditional 
public ownership model, and the ensuing spate of regulatory innovation as due to 
the inadequacy of the form of the private corporation to institutionalize the 
management of complex infrastructure services and utilities such as railways, 
electricity and telecommunications. Braithwaite and Drahos point to the enormous 
impact of what they describe as corporatization and securitization in creating mega-
corporate capitalism, but thereafter their discussion seems to take the corporate 
form largely for granted, at least in relation to financial market regulation.  
The basic proposition in this paper is that the key factor defining the dynamics of 
any regulatory regime is the specification of the property rights involved. 
Furthermore, inappropriate specification of property rights is generally the cause of 
both regulatory complexity and regulatory failure. The dominant perspective of 
`market-friendly’ regulation has generally assumed that what this requires is 
`strong’ property rights. This is combined with a `naturalization’ of existing 
property institutions due to the reification generated by the private property 
paradigm. These factors have too often obscured the vital importance of the initial 
specification of property rights in designing a regulatory regime. 
Interestingly, however, after three decades or more of experimentation, the issue 
of property rights has come increasingly to the fore. One of the objectives of this 
paper is to explore how and why this has taken place. The paper aims to do so by 
examining two examples: financial market regulation, and intellectual property 
rights (IPRs). The first will use a retrospective analysis of what can be learned from 
the financial crisis about the failures of financial market regulation. The second will 
consider how the expansion of private property rights in intellectual property has 
produced conflicts over rights-claims, mediated both by the reinterpretation of the 
scope of the rights, as well as by ever more complex international regulatory 
networks of a public-private character. 
2. Financial Market Regulation Caused the Crisis 
The great financial crash of 2007-8 was the culmination of over a quarter-century 
of international financial liberalization and re-regulation, resulting in a form of 
economic domination which has been described as `financialization’ (Epstein 2005, 
Krippner 2005, Montgomerie 2008, Ertuk et al. 2008). The cross-border and cross-
industry integration promoted by liberalization has involved (i) a shift in corporate 
funding from relational banking to market-based finance; (ii) a massive expansion 
of financial systems in relation to the real economy, (iii) an unprecedented growth 
of financial assets and leverage, (iv) the emergence of highly complex financial 
instruments and (v) extraordinary levels of financial trading. These factors have 
generated a far greater potential for financial instability, and an enhanced mobility 
of financial risks (Schinasi 2006, pp. 5-8). Not surprisingly, the period since 1971 
has seen a series of financial and especially banking crises, the crash of 2007-8 
being only the latest and greatest, which are unprecedented especially in 
comparison to the previous era of national monetary management and bank 
supervision (1937-73), when there were none (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, pp. 204-
8).  
Contrary to many conventional accounts, finance has become highly regulated in 
many countries and internationally, but in forms favouring private or quasi-public 
self-regulation. Crucially, these forms of regulation took for granted the structural 
underpinnings of the markets and the factors which led to their meteoric growth. 
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They focused instead on measures aiming to ensure the soundness of the 
participants, which in practice gave these actors the support and indeed the 
stimulus to turn finance into a self-sustaining sphere of circulation and speculation. 
Many commentators seem still to accept volatility and crisis as an endemic feature 
of modern finance, and to consider that regulation can at best hope for their 
management and mitigation rather than prevention. However, since it was the form 
taken by regulation which helped to create markets which are inherently prone to 
crisis, paying attention to these causes would surely help improve regulatory 
design. 
The emphasis since the 1970s on liberalization has allowed and encouraged 
financial firms to develop market-based finance, develop and trade in innovative 
instruments, and engage in trading both for their own account and for clients. 
Regulation by public authorities with responsibility for stability and security of the 
financial system (central banks and sectoral regulators) has concentrated on 
allocating responsibility for supervision of entities and establishing prudential 
standards for them, mainly in the form of capital reserve requirements. This has 
emerged as a process of international re-regulation through interacting regulatory 
networks, in which the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), formed in 
1974, has played a key role. Regulators have generally adopted a hands-off 
attitude towards financial transactions. Regulation of markets has mainly been done 
by private industry bodies: exchanges, clearing houses, credit rating agencies 
(CRAs), and private associations such as the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA). However, their formally private character is belied by the ways 
in which they have been empowered by public authorities and backed by law.3  
The enormous growth of bilateral or `over-the-counter’ (OTC) financial 
instruments, including an infinite variety of complex transactions in derivatives and 
swaps, which quickly grew to account for the vast bulk of the market,4 has been 
governed by the ISDA’s standard form contracts. These are backed by its private 
arbitration procedures, and supported by national legislation and rulings to ensure 
their enforcement (Partnoy 2002). However, standard form agreements such as the 
ISDA’s have serious limitations as regulatory instruments, as they are based on the 
existing consensus view of the risks entailed. This discourages parties from 
considering the specifics of the transaction, and puts all market participants in the 
same boat, although it may be a leaky one (Hudson 2009, para. 32-14). The 
private and bilateral nature of OTC contracts has also meant a serious lack of 
transparency, since neither market participants nor regulators have information 
about the exposures of counterparties. This was a key factor in the closing down of 
the interbank markets precipitating the 2007 crisis. 
The focus on firms and not transactions has created incentives for regulatory 
avoidance and arbitrage, by creating pressure on firms to move into markets and 
jurisdictions with lighter requirements, as well as to devise transactions avoiding 
such requirements. Financial firms have been stimulated to reduce their cost of 
capital by using innovative means to circumvent reserve requirements, and to 
exploit opportunities for international tax avoidance. At the same time, private 
bodies to which regulation of transactions and markets has been delegated have 
                                                 
3 In the US, since 1975, institutional investors have been required to place their funds in assets which 
are given a high or investment-grade by a recognized rating agency, and for most of the period since 
then only three such firms have been recognised White 2009, p. 392). The Basel II Capital Standards 
Framework (paras 90-108) gave responsibility to national regulators for approval of `external credit 
assessment institutions’ (ECAI), based on the criteria which it lays down, and its capital requirements 
are dependent on the ratings given by recognised ECAIs. For a more detailed account and analysis see 
Picciotto 2011, ch. 7. 
4 Since they are generally transferable and relatively standardized they are traded, although privately, 
not in an open market or exchange. The Bank for International Settlements has estimated that the total 
amounts of OTC contracts outstanding had grown by an average annual rate of 25% since 1998, but by 
33% in the period 2004-2007, reaching an estimated $516 trillion (BIS 2007). 
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inevitably developed vested interests in encouraging rather than controlling the 
growth of markets in those instruments.  
The primary form of regulation adopted by the public authorities has been capital 
reserve requirements, which had the effect of creating a false sense of security 
(sometimes referred to as `moral hazard’). Further encouragement for risk-taking 
was created by the guarantee of lender-of-last-resort (LLR) support in case of bank 
failure. This was provided both explicitly under deposit insurance schemes, but also 
through the backing given by central banks, due to the danger of a run on banks, 
and the systemic risk posed by major bank failures for the whole economy. The 
scope and extent of this implicit LLR support has been left deliberately vague, 
despite strong arguments that it should be clearly defined and limited, notably after 
the Asian financial crisis a decade earlier. 
The result was that the new forms of regulation, although increasingly extensive, 
have tended to encourage rather than control the forces leading to financialization 
and speculation. The focus on firms rather than markets also exacerbated the 
difficulties of achieving both international and inter-sectoral coordination between 
regulators, especially as liberalization broke down barriers between markets and 
brought different types of firms into competition. 
It is therefore hardly surprising that, in a period of rapid liberalization which has 
created ever wider and more open markets, regulatory failure has been endemic. 
The response has been to create new regulatory institutions and networks which 
have grown ever more complex, despite all efforts to improve their coordination. In 
the face of the best efforts of the regulators, the increasingly globalized financial 
system has generated new forms of risk and instability with ever-wider effects. 
Beginning from the wrong premises, a fatal spiral developed of regulation 
stimulating avoidance, innovation and risk-taking; the resulting dramatic crises 
spurring new regulation, which further heightened the drive to devise fantastical 
and risky activities. 
2.1. A New Minimalist Approach to Regulating Finance? 
The crash dramatically brought home how central the financial system is to the 
world economy. The realm of finance poses more sharply than any the central 
dilemmas facing economic regulation today. Financial transactions are considered 
to be quintessentially private, market relationships, yet a stable financial system is 
an essential public good. This sharp contradiction has been starkly driven home by 
the extensive state bailouts; yet governments have shunned the word 
nationalization, and have done all they can to leave firms in private hands. 
Although enormous private profits were made in the boom years, the cost of the 
bailouts fell on the public purse. It is therefore clear that any new approach to the 
regulation of finance should include a fundamental re-evaluation and rebalancing of 
the relationship between public authorities and regulators and the finance industry. 
This does not mean a return to outmoded and failed forms of statism, but new 
forms of governance in the public interest. 
Central to a new approach should be a withdrawal of property protection and state 
support for financialization, to restore something closer to efficient functioning of 
financial markets. If the foundations of finance were set more soundly, there could 
be much less regulation. The liberalization of financial markets since the 1970s 
resulted in hyper-regulation, which in turn has generated regulatory arbitrage and 
avoidance, spawning further regulation. The root of the problem has been the state 
protection and support for financial firms, which created perverse incentives and 
market distortions. These take three main forms.  
First, is the protection of limited liability. This enables the managers of all types of 
financial vehicles, from investment banks to hedge funds, to engage in speculation 
without assuming any personal risk. They are nevertheless able to appropriate a 
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high proportion of the revenues through profit-sharing and bonus schemes. In 
effect, they are able to use other people´s money to make bets from which they 
cannot lose.  
Secondly, the safety net of LLR support has been provided for virtually any type of 
financial firm. Retail financial firms (deposit-taking institutions), for which this type 
of support is necessary and intended, have been allowed to invest in all kinds of 
instruments and vehicles. This has provided enormous leverage for hedge funds 
and other kinds of arbitrageurs and speculators, and hence further incentives to 
gamble with no downside risk, while the state provides the safety-net to the 
lenders who greatly boost the speculators’ gigantic pools of finance, or indeed even 
to the speculators themselves if there is seen to be a systemic danger when they 
fail (e.g. the rescue of Long Term Credit Management in 1998).  
Thirdly, financial firms and transactions have greatly benefited from access to low-
cost capital due to exploitation of the opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion 
provided by the `offshore’ system. This has for long been well-known, but left to be 
dealt with by experts, who have approached it as a technical issue. The result has 
been an enormous growth of highly complex tax and financial regulations, loosely 
coordinated internationally, exemplified by the opaque and detailed rules for so-
called Controlled Foreign Corporations enacted in the main capitalist countries. 
These have been especially ineffective in curbing use of international tax avoidance 
by financial firms and others willing and able to exploit the indeterminacies of 
corporate residence and location of financial business resulting from the fictions of 
corporate personality and monetary transactions (Picciotto 1999). The resulting low 
or zero taxation of many kinds of international financial transactions has produced 
enormous economic distortions, and has been one of the main causes of 
financialization. 
Regrettably, the measures taken to reform the financial system so far are 
continuing essentially and even more quickly along the same road, although many 
commentators have pointed out that this will inevitably result in further crises, and 
alternative approaches have been suggested, even at the highest levels. The main 
emphasis has been put on increasing capital reserve requirements, coordinated 
internationally through the BCBS. As I have pointed out, this will further increase 
the pressure on firms to devise artificial forms avoiding the higher capital charge.  
Public concern about the enormous rewards for financiers has also increased the 
pressures for more effective international taxation, focusing on the role of tax 
havens and offshore finance centres. This has resulted in a drive to negotiate a 
network of tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs), which however have 
fundamental flaws. In particular, the main global financial centres, notably London 
and New York, have been unwilling to collect information on the beneficial 
ownership of deposits and financial assets held by non-residents, for fear of 
provoking portfolio capital outflows. Hence, they are in practice unable to provide 
information to many countries, actively facilitating tax evasion by their residents. 
They have been equally unwilling to take measures to ensure effective taxation of 
hedge funds and private equity vehicles which are in practice operated from within 
their jurisdictions, though nominally routing their transactions through havens such 
as the Cayman Islands (the largest centre for incorporation of hedge fund entities). 
The TIEAs negotiated with other key centres such as Switzerland have preserved 
the much prized banking secrecy, allowing them to continue to facilitate all kinds of 
avoidance and evasion.5  
Some central bankers, including Mervyn King, have expressed alarm at the effects 
of extending LLR support to the whole banking system: `It is not sensible to allow 
large banks to combine high street retail banking with risky investment banking or 
funding strategies, and then provide an implicit state guarantee against failure. 
                                                 
5 For further details see Picciotto (2011) note 5 above, chapter seven.  
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Something must give’ (King 2009, p. 7). There has indeed been a hot debate about 
various proposals for a separation between firms providing standard forms of 
financial intermediation as kind of a public utility, referred to as `utility banking’ or 
`narrow banking’, and those involved in more risky and speculative activities. A 
significant step in this direction was taken in January 2010, when President Obama 
(under political pressure) announced the principle, originating with Paul Volcker, 
that banks should `no longer be allowed to own, invest or sponsor hedge funds, 
private equity funds or proprietary trading operations for their own profit unrelated 
to serving their customers’. Proposals to implement the principle were introduced in 
the comprehensive legislation which became the focus of struggles in Congress. The 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010 gave extensive rulemaking and 
discretionary powers to various regulatory agencies, and opened a new era in the 
corporatist symbioisis between government and the large financial institutions. 
Furthermore, the Act watered down the Volcker Rule, and imposed only a limit on a 
bank’s investment in private equity and hedge funds of 3% of its tier 1 capital, and 
3% in any one fund. This does not prevent such banks from engaging in proprietary 
trading themselves, nor selling participations in their funds to clients; and the move 
was not internationally coordinated. Instead, the drive in Europe has been towards 
licensing managers of `alternative’ investment funds, which tackles the problem at 
the wrong end. Hedge fund investors are supposed to be sophisticated, or at least 
rich, so they may be left to bear their own losses. Indeed, licensing and regulation 
of such funds could be counter-productive by inducing a false sense of security in 
investors. 
The greatest regulatory gap revealed by the crisis is in relation to financial 
instruments, which were left almost entirely to private regulators. Plugging this gap 
needs more than the introduction of tighter controls on credit rating agencies such 
as the Code of Conduct put forward by IOSCO in 2008. Public regulators should 
have a more direct role, and there should be a reversal of the presumption in 
favour of financial innovation. Financial derivatives should be treated like 
pharmaceutical drugs. No-one suggests that all new drugs should be released on 
the market, leaving it to consumers or even doctors to decide how safe they are 
and for which uses. The financial crisis starkly demonstrated that financial 
derivatives can be economically toxic, and they should be regulated accordingly, 
through a system of registration and certification. The approvals process should 
include determination of the tax treatment, as well as conditions of use: how they 
should be treated on the balance-sheet and for capital provisioning, and which 
categories of investor should be allowed to deal in each. Regrettably, although 
some commentators have proposed such an approach,6 regulatory proposals have 
not emerged. 
The most radical, and yet simple, proposal has been Laurence Kotlikoff’s scheme for 
`limited purpose banking’. This would combine prior approval by a single public 
regulator of all financial instruments, based on full transparency of the risk 
evaluation, with a conversion of all banks (i.e. financial firms) into pure 
intermediaries selling shares in different kinds of mutual funds (Kotlikoff 2010). 
This would have the great merit of greatly reducing the extent of regulation, by 
targeting the crucial point: approval of the financial instruments which may be 
marketed, and their restriction to mutual investment funds. It also aims to avoid 
the need for LLR support, by turning banks into cash mutual funds, and hence with 
one hundred percent capital reserve; while requiring investors in other kinds of 
funds to take on their risk, on a mutual basis. This would shift much of the 
responsibility of managing investment risk onto investors, which is desirable and 
necessary, but inappropriate for most small savers. Such needs could perhaps be 
                                                 
6 It was suggested in the Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements in 2009 (pp. 126-7), 
and even the Turner report accepted that direct regulation of both retail and wholesale financial products 
should be considered (Turner 2009, pp. 106-110). 
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catered for by suitable broad-based mutual investment funds. However, the main 
purposes of social savings are for healthcare, social security and pensions, which 
entail a degree of socialization that must surely entail public provision. 
3. Contested Concepts of Property and Hyper-Regulation 
My second example is taken from an area of regulation more centrally concerned 
with the specification of property rights: intellectual property rights (IPRs). IPRs 
have been a major mechanism for corporate appropriation of scientific and 
technical knowledge and cultural production for over a century, and thus central to 
corporate oligopoly and economic dominance. Competitive strategies of 
appropriation and monopolization have been mediated by contested claims and 
interpretations of property rights as expressed in the key concepts of IPRs. These 
conflicts have also spawned various types of regulatory regimes attempting to 
accommodate these conflicting claims and allocate rights and remuneration. 
IPRs have become formulated as private property, which gives the right to exclude 
others from using an asset, although this is in many ways inappropriate for 
knowledge-based assets, since they do not deplete when shared (in economic 
terms, they are non-rival). However, the emergence and development of the 
modern concepts of IPRs as private rights was counterpointed by the emergence of 
the concept of the public domain (Rose 2003). This key public-private boundary has 
been continually contested, through the development and reinterpretation of the 
key concepts underpinning IPRs. 
3.1. Copyright, the Public Domain and Negotiating Remuneration 
Replacing state licensing of printing, modern copyright gave a publisher exclusive 
rights for a limited period, after which others could freely republish. The extent to 
which emulation of a work protected by copyright could been permitted has 
depended on interpretive debates about what constitutes copying, most recently in 
relation to the `look and feel’ of computer programs. The scope of copyright has 
depended on interpretation and extension of the elastic concept of the right to 
control `reproduction’, which became increasingly important as new communication 
technologies emerged. The assertion of exclusive private rights has repeatedly 
come into conflict with activities popularly considered legitimate, such as playing 
music in public spaces, whether live in cafés, or through radio broadcasts, or most 
recently on YouTube. These conflicts have been mediated and managed by the 
creation of forms of collective licensing, which themselves have been the focus of 
contending property conceptions. Advocates of private property have accepted 
collective licensing on sufferance as a necessary evil and stressed its private 
contractual nature, deploring any compulsion ignoring the compulsion resulting 
from the initial definition of the property right (Jehoram 2001); while others have 
described it as entailing a socialization of property rights (Kretschmer 2002).  
The most recent challenge to the exclusive private rights paradigm of copyright has 
been mounted by Google, using its immense power over internet communication. 
Within five years of launching Google Books in 2004 it had digitized over ten million 
books, some two million of which are out of copyright, six million in copyright but 
out of print, and two million in copyright and in print. This project will be central to 
the future of book publishing in the digital age, and is inevitably the focus of 
contending claims and complex multi-jurisdictional litigation. An audacious attempt 
to create a novel form of private regulation to govern it was made in the Google 
Books Settlement, which in effect would create a gigantic collective rights 
organization; but this is likely to remain contested (Samuelson 2010; see also 
Picciotto 2011, ch. 9.3), especially as the proposed settlement was rejected by a 
New York district court in March 2011. Esssentially, these continuing conflicts over 
the nature and scope of copyright have been competitive contests over the 
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allocation of rights and remuneration for the enjoyment and exploitation of cultural 
products. 
3.2. Conflicts over Patentability: Medicines and Biotechnology 
The struggle to control new technologies through patenting has also seen continual 
conflicts over the assertion of private rights and the scope and nature of the public 
domain or the commons, and their mediation through new forms of regulatory 
regime, often private. The expansion of the boundaries of patentability has entailed 
exploiting the grey areas between a discovery (which is not patentable) and an 
invention (which is). Interpreting this distinction has been especially crucial for the 
life-science industries, from organic chemistry to biotechnology (Dutfield 2009), 
which operate at the interface between humankind and nature. Chemical patenting 
was always problematic, since it is hard to classify a naturally occurring chemical 
compound as a new invention, and many pharmaceutical drugs have in any case 
been based on compounds discovered in nature, notably the twentieth century’s 
wonder drugs, aspirin, and penicillin (Jeffrys 2004, Temin 1979, p. 434). Hence, 
even in countries which did not exclude patents on medicines, they were not 
frequent until the second half of the twentieth century. The situation changed in 
1948 when Merck obtained a US patent for streptomycin, although it had been 
identified in soil samples, on the grounds that it had been isolated from nature and 
purified to enable it to be `produced, distributed and administered in a practicable 
way' (Temin 1979, p. 436).  
The form of legal protection helped to shape and transform the industries. In the 
US, the shift to regular patenting of new drugs occurred at the same time that 
obtaining marketing approval for such drugs became more expensive and drawn-
out, as systems for prior approval were established and gradually strengthened, 
especially after dramatic failures such as thalidomide. So in the US and some other 
countries, `big pharma’ firms emerged, pouring enormous sums into R&D and 
testing, aiming to achieve super-profits if they could find a patentable wonder-drug. 
Hence, while the pharma firms and their defenders consider that patent protection 
is justified by the high investments and long lead-times due to testing, the effect 
has been to lock the pharmaceutical industry into a pattern of seeking pills for rich 
peoples’ ailments. 
The `isolation from nature’ doctrine again became a focus of contestation with the 
emergence of biotechnology. The stage was set by the famous decision of the US 
Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980 447 US 303) that `anything 
under the sun that is made by man’ is patentable. This opened the floodgates for 
patent protection, especially for biotechnology products, most notoriously with the 
Harvard `oncomouse’, and the method for animal cloning which was used to 
`create’ Dolly the sheep. The decision chimed in with US policies in the 1980s to 
foster knowledge-based business, resulting in moves to provide easier and stronger 
patent protection. The specialist patent Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit 
(CAFC) established in 1982 adopted a more accommodating approach to 
patentability, especially the non-obviousness criterion. This relaxation affected a 
number of fields, in particular allowing patent protection for software and for 
business methods, as well as biotechnology. 
Biotechnology patenting in particular has become highly contested, on both 
technical patent law7 and ethical grounds, since these technologies involve human 
interventions in nature (Drahos 1999, Sterckx 2000), and are charged with 
contributing to the commodification of life-forms by amoral science allied to big 
business (Bowring 2003). The emergence of the new genetic sciences has sparked 
off a host of conflicts and debates, and has resulted in many new regulatory 
                                                 
7 Such patents can be challenged both on the grounds of lack of novelty (since biotechnology is 
essentially an automated computerized process), and lack of industrial utility (since the functions of 
gene sequences are often unknown or unpredictable).  
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provisions and arenas, interacting in various ways, not least in the realm of ethics. 
These contests have become mediated through complex and interacting networks 
of different regimes of regulation (Black 1998, Landfried 1999, Amani and Coombe 
2005), intersecting also with trade rules for example on GM foods. 
3.3. Bioprospecting 
Fraught conflicts emerged also over bioprospecting, sometimes more emotively 
termed biopiracy. Bio-prospectors became active in searching out genetic 
resources, especially in developing countries which have high biodiversity. These 
practices also took advantage of traditional knowledge, for example by aiming to 
identify the specific genes responsible for the beneficial properties of plants long-
known to particular communities or groups. Genetic materials are now held by 
public bodies or private firms in bio-banks or databases, which make them available 
for analysis to identify cell lines or genes with potentially useful traits, such as 
disease resistance. Public biobanks tend to lend out samples for a nominal charge, 
and to leave it to users to negotiate with the original suppliers of the sample if a 
commercial application results, while the commercial biobanks provide access for 
research purposes under licences which retain the right to negotiate commercial 
terms for use in any application which may result (Parry 2004). 
Bioprospecting was especially dramatized by the well-known conflicts over patents 
for formulations based on extracts of oil from the neem tree, claiming various uses 
as pesticides and fungicides, even though the many beneficent uses of the neem 
have been known in India reputedly for some 2000 years. Nevertheless, the 
agribusiness firm W. R. Grace, together with the US Department of Agriculture, was 
granted several US patents in 1990, despite attempted objections by activists and 
the government of India (Baglery 2003, p.680, Moyer-Henry 2008). A related 
patent was also granted by the European Patent Office (EPO) in 1994, but there a 
successful legal challenge was mounted by `an international network of patent 
warriors’, including the Indian campaigner Vandana Shiva (Shiva 2007, p. 281), 
although it took ten years to bring to a final positive conclusion. The different 
outcome in Europe was due partly to different views of the novelty requirement: 
the EPO’s Board of Opposition accepted evidence of prior public use of neem 
extracts by Indian farmers as a fungicide, supported also by a document published 
by Indian scientists in Australia (Dolder 2006). Probably equally important for the 
outcome was the vociferous public campaign in Europe, where the EPO office in 
Munich on the day of the hearing was the target of a demonstrators with placards 
proclaiming `No Patents for Theft’, and handing in a petition signed by over 
100,000 Indian citizens (Bullard 2005).  
At about the same time, a similar claim to the EPO was made for an appetite 
suppressant based on the hoodia plant, whose properties were part of the 
traditional knowledge of the San people of southern Africa. This claim was rejected 
by the examiner for lack of novelty, but a revised claim was accepted on appeal, 
although on dubious grounds (Dolder 2006). In this case, however, those 
representing the San people were persuaded to discontinue their opposition, largely 
by the offer of payments of $120,000 for clinical testing and a share in the profits 
of any eventual product of six percent of the royalties (Moyer-Henry 2008). 
Following these conflicts, the interactions became more complex. Interventions by 
activist groups and developing country governments made patent offices examine 
more closely claims based on traditional knowledge, such as the use of turmeric 
powder for wound healing, extracts of the maca plant for sexual disfunction, or the 
yellow Mexican `enola’ bean. This led to the rapid development of national and 
regional systems to regulate Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS). These are now 
being debated and contested in a variety of international arenas and networks, 
including the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
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3.4. Plant Varieties 
Another significant battle fought at the interface between collective, common and 
private property has concerned the protection of plant varieties. For long, new 
varieties were developed by the time-honoured practices of experimental cross-
breeding by farmers and botanists. In the early part of the twentieth century this 
became systematized and supported by systems of quality certification, and many 
countries established public collections both of growing plants (in situ) and plant 
matter (ex situ). `Indeed, in the early days the private sector relied heavily on 
public lines for the development of new plant varieties … particularly … for field 
crops such as corn’ (Smolders 2005, p. 7). However, the increasingly large 
investments in breeding led to pressures for some protection. In 1930, the US 
created a plant patent, but only for asexually reproducing plants excluding tubers, 
while in 1938 Germany provided for a sui generis plant variety right.  
On the initiative of France, an international system was established in 1961 by a 
Union for the protection of new varieties of plants (UPOV). This provided for a plant 
breeder’s right (PBR), to protect any new variety which could be shown to be 
distinct, uniform and stable. The PBR covered any type of plant, but it was initially 
defined quite narrowly, granting proprietorial rights only over commercialization, 
hence allowing propagation by other breeders. This also meant that growers could 
save seeds for their own replanting and for exchange, which came to be called the 
`farmers’ privilege’. However, revisions of UPOV especially in 1991, extended PBRs 
to production, reproduction and propagation, and extended protection to harvested 
material including plants and to essentially derived varieties. States are allowed to 
retain the farmers’ privilege, but only for farmers to propagate for themselves; 
thus, in revised versions of the UPOV exchange between farmers or 
commercialization of a derivative variety requires permission. In the meantime in 
the 1980s, following Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the USPTO began to grant ordinary 
utility patents to plants. The European Patent Convention (EPC) excludes patents 
for plant varieties and for `essentially biological processes for the production of 
plants’, but the extent of this limitation is subject to interpretation. 
This has created a highly complex situation, with a great variety of forms of 
protection in different countries, each with its own conditions and providing a 
different scope of protection. The US alone offers utility patents, plant patents, and 
plant variety protection; other states are parties to different versions of UPOV, and 
their national laws can vary greatly. The WTO’s agreement on Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) article 27 now requires WTO members to 
provide some `effective’ form of plant variety protection, and developing countries 
have been urged to take advantage of the flexibilities offered by UPOV. Indeed, this 
arena can be seen as a paradigmatic example of the strategic interactions through 
which conflicting and overlapping regulatory processes create `regime complexes’ 
(Raustiala and Victor 2004). 
At the same time, the intensification of plant breeding, especially through 
biotechnology, raised issues about the legitimate uses of plant material made 
available freely in public collections. There was particular concern about the use of 
material housed in the network of International Agricultural Research Centers 
(IARCs), loosely coordinated through the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR), aimed particularly at food crops for developing 
countries. This had originated with a programme initiated by the Rockefeller 
Foundation with the Mexican government in 1943, which developed a high-yielding 
wheat variety, later transferred to India. In response to concern about the food 
crisis in poor countries, the network of IARCs grew, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) played an increased role, and in 1971 the World Bank agreed to 
set up and host the CGIAR.8  
                                                 
8 See http://www.cgiar.org/who/history/origins.html. 
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From this perspective, there was greater concern for safeguarding biodiversity as 
collective or common property. Hence, the FAO in 1983 adopted a plan of action for 
a Global System for Conservation and Utilization of Plant Genetic Resources. Its 
centrepiece was a formally non-binding Undertaking, which firmly stated that it was 
`based on the universally accepted principle that plant genetic resources are a 
heritage of mankind and consequently should be available without restriction’. 
However, the implications of this principle were contested. Agreed Interpretations 
adopted in 1989 declared that PBRs, especially as governed by the UPOV, were 
`not incompatible’ with the Undertaking, and that `free access does not mean free 
of charge’. A separate resolution endorsed the general concept of farmers’ rights 
`vested in the International Community, as trustee for present and future 
generations of farmers’;9 a later resolution in 1991 affirmed that the `common 
heritage’ principle was subject to state sovereignty over plant genetic resources, 
and this was elaborated in the Convention on Biological Diversity in 1992. However, 
regulation of the use of germplasm accessed from public collections was left for 
further discussion in the FAO. During the 1990s controversies arose about 
patenting of biotechnological innovations derived from matter acquired from IARCs, 
and licences including a benefit-sharing arrangement were devised in some cases. 
Agreement was finally reached in 2001 on an International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture (IT-PGRFA). It committed the parties to 
promote sustainable agriculture, within an international framework, and spelled out 
in more detail the principle of farmers’ rights, including the right to seeds, although 
these depend on state regulation. Its most distinctive and innovative achievement 
was the establishment of a multilateral system which aims both to provide open 
source access to seeds and other germplasm for research, breeding and crop 
development, and to channel income from any commercial development into a 
global fund to promote conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources, 
particularly by farmers and indigenous communities.  
However, the IT-PGRFA still retains some ambiguity as to whether private rights 
can be claimed on material derived from the resources accessed from the open 
source system. Its key article 12.3(d) states: 
Recipients shall not claim any intellectual property or other rights that limit the 
facilitated access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, or their 
genetic parts or components, in the form received from the multilateral system. 
This was the result of a compromise in the drafting negotiations (Helfer 2004, 
Mekouar 2002, Cooper 2002), and the implications of the term `in the form 
received’ are far from clear. Nevertheless, the phrase is repeated in the standard 
material transfer agreement (SMTA), which has been adopted to provide uniform 
licensing terms for material accessed under this multilateral system.10 
States party to the IT-PGRFA agreed to place under the multilateral system all plant 
genetic resources under their control and in the public domain for sixty-four crops 
listed in Annex 1, and invited others to do the same. The listed items were chosen 
for their importance for food and agriculture, but did not include important crops 
such as tomatoes, soybeans, or peanuts. A major extension resulted in 2006 when 
agreements were signed with eleven of the IARCs, which hold ex situ collections of 
some 650,000 accessions of germplasm, including the world’s most important 
crops. As the IARCs began using the SMTA in 2007, it has become a foundational 
instrument for managing the use of plant material in breeding and biotechnology.  
The SMTA establishes a kind of regulated global commons for material made 
available within the system. Conditions are laid down on recipients of material, 
which they in turn must apply if they transfer the material to others. They are that: 
                                                 
9 As noted above, this concept was implicit in the UPOV, but it emerged in FAO discussions, see 
http://www.farmersrights.org/about/fr_history.html. 
10 Available from http://www.planttreaty.org/smta_en.htm. 
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(i) use of the material is only for `the purposes of research, breeding and training 
for food and agriculture’ not including `chemical, pharmaceutical and/or other non-
food/feed industrial uses’; (ii) recipients are required to make available all non-
confidential information resulting from R&D on the material through the treaty’s 
information-sharing system; and they are encouraged to share with others the non-
monetary benefits of the system (transfer of technology and capacity-building to 
developing countries); (iii) recipients cannot claim IPRs on the material or its 
genetic components `in the form received’; (iv) if a recipient commercializes a 
PGRFA product that incorporates material, a defined royalty must be paid if such 
product is not available to others without restriction for further research and 
breeding;11 if there is no such restriction, defined voluntary payments are 
encouraged; (v) if recipients transfer material to another person, or transfer to 
another person IPRs on any products derived from the material or its components, 
such transfers must be subject to the same conditions, including the benefit-
sharing obligations. 
The emphasis of the system is on ensuring use for the collective good, and sharing 
the results of research and development. However, it accepts that a commercialized 
product may result, and in that case expects monetary benefit-sharing, into a 
Benefit Sharing Fund, to be used to finance projects under the FAO’s Global Plan of 
Action adopted prior to the IT-PGRFA in 1996. It is not yet clear how much income 
this will produce, and the strategic plan adopted in 2009 envisages that the Fund 
will mainly depend on other sources. There are obvious similarities with the kind of 
open-access systems that have been developed for software, as some 
commentators have pointed out (Srinivas 2006, Hope 2008, Aoki 2009).  
At the same time, the debates about, and the introduction of concepts and systems 
for, benefit-sharing have begun to provide a means for managing the contested 
interactions between different resource regimes and knowledge domains. As Anil 
Gupta, founder of the Honey Bee Network, has argued `[a]chieving sustainability in 
resource use requires the fusion of sacred with secular, formal with informal, and 
reductionist with holistic views’ (Gupta 2005, p. 31). However, as his practical 
experience has shown, this requires scientists to work closely with local 
communities, to encourage and support grassroots innovators.12 The formal top-
down systems for benefit-sharing can only at best provide a framework for such 
bottom-up activity. 
4. Conclusions: Property rights and Regulation 
As both of these examples show, the main driver for the growth of regulatory 
regimes has been competitive struggles mediated by claims to private property 
protection and other forms of public support of private rights. Many of the key 
property institutions of corporate capitalism have come to be seen as `natural’: 
notably, the corporate form itself, and patents and other IPRs. In the period of 
liberalization and privatization since the 1980s, the collapse of state ownership led 
to a transfer of many activities to corporations, sometimes supplemented by 
regulation. The preference for `market-friendly regulation’ led to the assumption 
that this required `strong’ property rights. Even among those who drew attention 
to the institutional embedding of markets, little attention was paid to the form of 
property rights. Indeed, such was the power of fetishized conceptions of property 
that the term itself has generally been used to mean private property. 
                                                 
11 The FAO’s website provides no guidance on what this means; however, one of the IARCs, the 
International Rice Research Institute, advises that `Plant Breeder’s Rights under UPOV type Plant 
Varietal Protection (PVP) laws do not restrict the further use of the variety for research and breeding. 
Commercialization of a new variety that is protected by this type of Plant Breeder’s Rights developed 
from IRRI germplasm would not trigger mandatory payments under the Treaty’ see 
http://www.irri.org/grc/requests/SMTAFAQ.htm#c7. 
12 For more about this work see http://www.sristi.org. 
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Both the examples in this paper also exemplify the growth of hyper-regulation and 
complex regulatory networks and interactions, both multi-level, and public-private. 
Generally, the public sphere (the state and intergovernmental organizations) has 
been dominated by liberal political forms of interest-representation, and has 
therefore been susceptible to pressures to extend proprietary rights and protection. 
It has often been left to private forms of regulation to manage the contestations 
between rights-owners. Not surprisingly, these often take the form of `regulatory 
contracts’: for example, as discussed above the ISDA’s forms for derivatives, or the 
SMTA which governs transfers of plant genetic material.  
Interestingly, also, in some fields the competitive contestations over proprietary 
rights have led to the emergence of new forms of common property regimes, for 
example (as discussed in section 3) the plant gene access and benefit-sharing 
systems. Indeed, in the field of IPRs more generally, the excessive extension of 
private property protection in state and international law has been counterpointed 
by the emergence of new IP regimes based on rights to remuneration rather than 
exclusivity. In the field of copyright this has been achieved by the combination of 
the revolt of guerrilla-consumers through file-sharing, and the power of new media 
firms, especially Google.  
I suggest that this is a very different picture from those normally painted by studies 
of regulation dominated by the more usual functionalist paradigm. The focus on 
property rights and their contestation helps to explain both the central paradoxical 
features discussed in Section 1: the phenomenon of liberalization leading to 
`hyper-regulation’, and the new types of public-private interaction. This perspective 
also suggests that the central adage in designing `smart regulation’ should be: try 
to define the property rights appropriately. 
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